

# A FLEXIBLE, VERIFIABLE, AND VALIDATEABLE APPROACH TO AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE SAFETY



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# SAFETY VS CERTIFICATION AXIOMS

## SAFETY



SOMETHING CERTIFIED MAY NOT BE SAFER

## CERTIFICATION




SOMETHING SAFER MAY NOT BE CERTIFIED

*ESPECIALLY TRUE WITH SOFTWARE SYSTEMS*

*CERTIFICATION HARD TO KEEP UP WITH EXPONENTIAL TECHNOLOGY GROWTH*

# COMPLEXITY INCREASE WITH AUTONOMY



# WORLDS COLLIDING


AUTOMOTIVE CONTROLS



LOW-LEVEL  
SIMPLER  
EASIER TO V&V


FULL  
AUTONOMY

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE



ABSTRACT/PROBABILISTIC-LEVEL  
HIGHEST COMPLEXITY  
IMPOSSIBLE TO V&V


LARGE SCALEABLE IT SOFTWARE



HIGHER-LEVEL  
SCALABLE COMPLEXITY  
DIFFICULT TO V&V

# NON-SCALING LEGACY CERTIFICATION

CERTIFICATION  
COSTS



# SCALING FOR FULL AUTONOMY

## ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

MACHINE LEARNING METHODS  
(NEURAL NETWORKS, MARKOV MODELS, RULES)

## LARGE SCALEABLE IT SOFTWARE


HIGHER LEVEL PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES  
(JAVA, C#, PYTHON, RUBY)

HIGHER LEVEL PROGRAMMING METHODS  
(OBJECT-ORIENTED, FRAMEWORKS, MANAGED RUNTIMES)


## EMBEDDED-IT INTERSECTIONS

HIGH-LEVEL REAL-TIME PROGRAMMING  
(REAL-TIME OS, REAL-TIME JAVA)

# HOW DO WE MAKE THIS SAFE?



# SAFETY WATCHDOG



# WATCHDOG SPECIFICATION PROCESS

SYSTEM SPECIFICATION

SAFETY-CRITICAL SPEC SUBSET

MAPPED V&V'D SAFETY CHECKING FUNCTIONS

MAPPED V&V'D WATCHDOG RULES

```

1. The system shall do this.
1.1 The system shall do this and that.
1.1.1 The system shall do this and that.
1.2 The system shall do this and that.
1.2.1 The system shall do this and that.
1.2.2 The system shall do this and that.
1.3 The system shall do this and that.
2. The system shall do this and that.
2.1 The system shall do this and that.
2.2 The system shall do this and that.
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2.3.2 The system shall do this and that.
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2.3.4.2 The system shall do this and that.
2.4 The system shall do this and that.
3. The system shall do this and that.
3.1 The system shall do this and that.
3.1.1 The system shall do this and that.
3.1.2 The system shall do this and that.
    
```

SAFETY ANALYSIS

```

1. The system shall do this.
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3.1.1 The system shall do this and that.
3.1.2 The system shall do this and that.
    
```

SAFETY FUNCTIONS

```

1. Safety Functions - ACDT will avoid wrong
derivations.

This safety function is to address the hazard of
a person or machine operating a permit-
ted by the ACDT that has exceeded its
design limits. Operating a permit-
ted by to avoid wrong, you should
ensure that the ACDT has been
checked and is the best thing to avoid
any, and other consequences.
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a person or machine operating a permit-
ted by the ACDT that has exceeded its
design limits. Operating a permit-
ted by to avoid wrong, you should
ensure that the ACDT has been
checked and is the best thing to avoid
any, and other consequences.
    
```

HAZARD ANALYSES,  
FORMAL METHODS,  
OR V&V'D METHODS

```

if X > Y, then Z = off
assert beta = 20
SBD status on
If Rtheta > TBD, then speed.limit = 20
if X > Y, then Z = off
assert beta = 20
SBD status on
If Rtheta > TBD, then speed.limit = 20
    
```

DERIVATION PROCESS

```


Gps.qual < X
if speed > X, steering < Y
Assert SBD < X
Lidar.1.status = 1
    
```

VERIFIABLE & VALIDATEABLE PROCESS

DERIVATION PROCESS



# CODED INFORMATION




UNIQUELY  
IDENTIFY  
INFO


ENSURE  
INFO  
"FRESHNESS"

PROTECT  
AGAINST  
CORRUPTION


# CODING SAFETY-CRITICAL INFORMATION



# WATCHDOG SERVICE APPROACH



# FAIL-SAFE WATCHDOG REACTION SERVICE



# SUMMARY

- CURRENT CERTIFICATION METHODS “DATED” TO DEAL WITH FULL AUTONOMY COMPLEXITY
- HIGHER LEVEL PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES/METHODS (FROM IT) + MODERN FRAMEWORKS/RUNTIMES + AI/ML REQUIRED TO ADDRESS FULL AUTONOMY COMPLEXITY
- NEW APPROACHES NEEDED FOR SAFETY WITH FULL AUTONOMY
- SIMPLE VERIFIABLE/VALIDATEABLE WATCHDOG APPROACH
  - Provable and quantifiable safety
  - Bonus: Same approach to safety applies to security